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Abstract
International Relations scholarship has begun to focus a great deal of attention on
social networks and their inﬂuence on political outcomes. In this paper, we contribute
to this eﬀort by examining INGO network relations across four issues areas: the en-
vironment, health, human rights, and development. Using original data on over 4000
INGOs, we ﬁnd that the characteristics of network relations across the four areas are
in fact quite diﬀerent. Further, we ﬁnd that these diﬀerences are driven in part by the
nature of the INGOs - including whether they are narrowly or broadly focused, located
in the global North or South, and their ties to intergovernmental organizations. Finally,
we explore the manner in which diﬀerences in INGO networks inﬂuence political and
behavioral outcomes and organizational eﬀectiveness.
∗Note: Prepared for the Political Networks Conference, Duke University, May 19-21, 2010.
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1 Introduction
Coordination and collaboration among international non-governmental organizations (here-
after INGOs) has been highlighted as an important key to social or political change (Keck
and Sikkink 1998; Boli and Thomas 1999; Anheier and Katz 2004; Ahmed and Potter 2006).
The creation of the International Criminal Court, for example, occurred after INGOs coor-
dinated their eﬀorts through the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (Simmons
1998; Glasius 2002, 2006). Similarly, many contend that the banning of landmines came
about as a result of INGO and civil society coordination: INGOs on the ground gathering
information were tied to other organizations with specialized governmental and media con-
nections (Rutherford 2000; Warkentin 2001; Price 2003b,a). Likewise, many environmental
INGOs joined forces to push for the end of chloroﬂuorocarbon use in the 1980s and 1990s
(Raustiala 1997; Breitmeier and Rittberger 2000). Even in humanitarian relief, INGO co-
ordination is important. For example, to help Indian Ocean tsunami victims eﬀectively in
2004, development and health INGOs coordinated with each other, intergovernmental orga-
nizations, and aid foundations (Kamran 2009). The United States Agency for International
Development (U.S. AID) sees cooperation and connections between non-state actors as crit-
ical for coordination, knowledge sharing, and policy advocacy in poverty relief (Abelson
2003).
At the most basic level, INGOs are argued to work not only as individual organizations,
but as part of a larger network of INGOs, intergovernmental organizations (hereafter IGOs),
states, and concerned citizens. This is outlined in the canonical transnational advocacy
network framework (Keck and Sikkink 1998). However, there are many examples, both
in the practitioner and scholarly literatures, of INGOs refusing or failing to collaborate or
coordinate their eﬀorts, often with very harmful overall eﬀects (Covey 1995; Edwards and
Hulme 1996; Hulme and Edwards 1997; Cooley and Ron 2002; Hamdani 2006). Cooley and
Ron (2002), for example, outlines numerous instances of inter-INGO competition, where
the market of aid donations undermines the desires of INGOs to coordinate for political or
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social outcomes (14). Smith (2002) and others have attested to divisions between INGOs in
the global North and South limiting coordination of the total social movement. 1 A lack
of collaboration with outside INGOs may also limit within-INGO organizational learning
(Ebrahim 2005). Thus, although INGO networking and coordination appears to be impor-
tant for achieving their often lofty mission objectives, a lack of coordination may severely
limit the impact of INGOs.
Despite the theoretical importance of INGO coordination, very few studies have em-
pirically examined what INGO coordination (sometimes referred to as the INGO network )
looks like.2 Moreover, consistent with what the majority of organization theory and network
analysis studies demonstrate, simply being connected or networked does not automatically
result in inﬂuence; the nature and structure of the overall network matters for overall eﬃcacy,
eﬃciency, and information transmission (Krackhardt 1994; Wasserman and Faust 1994; De-
Canio, Dibble and Amir-Ateﬁ 2000; Watts 2004a; Newman, Barabasi and Watts 2006; Siegel
2009). By examining network characteristics of INGOs, therefore, we gain valuable informa-
tion into their potential eﬃcacy.
This paper makes three important contributions to the study of INGO networks. First
by directly measuring, describing and comparing the characteristics of INGO networks in
and across four issue areas - environment, health, human rights and sustainable develop-
ment, we answer the question are there fundamental diﬀerences in the characteristics of
INGO networks? Given the overwhelming focus on advocacy INGOs, such as human rights
and environmental INGOs, in comparison to service INGOs, such as health or sustainable
development INGOs, within the extant international relations literature, we feel attention to
diﬀerences across these various mission foci is theoretically important. Second we assess how
1For further discussion of the North/South divide in relation to INGOs, see Fowler (1992); James (1994);
Dieng (2001)
2This paper, to our knowledge, represents the ﬁrst attempt to compare across both advocacy and service
INGOs. We want to stress, however, that there exists other network analysis and network theory projects
on subsets of INGOs. These cross-disciplinary papers make many contributions to overall scholarship. See,
for example,Caniglia 2001; Anheier and Katz 2004; Katz 2006; Murdie, Brewington and Davis 2009; Wong
2008; Lake and Wong 2009.
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the characteristics of INGOs themselves, such as permanent oﬃce location and connections
to major IGOs, contribute to diﬀerences in network forms. Finally, we examine how diﬀer-
ences in INGO networks condition their eﬀectiveness in achieving their goals. Our central
argument is very simple. INGOs diﬀer in their focus and capacity. These diﬀerences have
important consequences for how INGOs relate to or inter act with each other. 3
This paper proceeds as follows. First, we detail the new INGO network data and present
both statistical and visual representations of INGO networks in these four substantive areas
of interest. Second, we discuss the sources of heterogeneity within INGOs and develop
hypotheses about how heterogeneity inﬂuences network structure. Third, the research design
and empirical results are outlined in detail. Finally, the paper concludes by addressing the
implications of these ﬁndings for cross-disciplinary INGO theory and examining the policy
and practical implications of this research for INGOs themselves.
2 INGOs - Measuring Network Characteristics
Scholars and practitioners have long recognized that INGOs work both individually and
collectively in pursuit of their mission objectives (Elliot 1987; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse
and Ropp 1999; DeMars 2005; Wong 2008; Najam 1996). Yet, relatively little is known about
the nature of INGO interactions. In the following section, we ﬁrst describe the network data
employed in the analysis and present visual descriptions of INGO networks across the four
diﬀerent issue areas. We then review the theoretical and applied literature on network
characteristics, particularly small word characteristics, and outline how this characteristic
applies to networks of INGOs.
3As Taylor (2002) points out, the cross-disciplinary INGO literature could also beneﬁt from more descrip-
tive analyzes, especially those focusing on distinctions between various non-state actors.
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2.1 INGO Relational Data
There is very little easily accessible, high quality data on INGO networks, especially for
issue-speciﬁc INGO activities. Most existing studies on INGOs utilize data collected from
the Yearbook of International Organizations, a publication of the Union of International As-
sociations, an INGO itself whose mission is the facilitation of the development and eﬃciency
of non-governmental networks (UIA 2008/2009. See Boli and Thomas 1999; Landman 2005;
Neumayer 2005; Smith 2005; Smith andWiest 2005; Boli and Brewington 2007; Author 2009).
Past research has only focused on very small subsets of issue-speciﬁc INGOs (Caniglia 2001;
Anheier and Katz 2004; Katz 2006; Murdie, Brewington and Davis 2009; Wong 2008; Lake
and Wong 2009). We hope to add to the existing literature on INGOs by creating the ﬁrst
overall INGO network data. This dataset, which in its entirety spans over 10 years and cov-
ers over 60,000 INGOs, represents a major advance in capturing the networking behavior of
INGOs. The Union of International Associations (UIA) produces a list of all active INGOs
in the world by asking other INGOs for new organization information, looking at lists of IN-
GOs produced by donor foundations and international organizations, and original research
of newspaper and practitioner reports. The UIA then collects data on all INGOs on its list
by sending out information requests to the organizations themselves. The UIA asks these
organizations to self report a plethora of information, including the organization's mission
or aims, its services and languages used, main and secondary addresses, structure, staﬀ,
and membership details. It has, since 1910, published its ﬁndings in its annually released
Yearbook.
For our project, INGO data is based on the information provided in the 2001-2002 Year-
book CD-Rom edition.4 Data on issue-speciﬁc focuses were complied using quantitative
content analysis of the mission-statement provided to the UIA. We identiﬁed 4,378 orga-
nizations that ﬁt both the accepted deﬁnition of an INGO and had an issue area focus of
4The 2001/2002 Yearbook was chosen for this project to compare to the existing 2001-2002 data we have
from a hand-coding project (Murdie, Brewington and Davis 2009). Our current codings of multiple years of
information reveals that this year is typical to overall patterns in the data source.
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either human rights (663 INGOs), sustainable development (158 INGOs), environmental
(1019 INGOs), health (1695 INGOs), or a some combination (843 INGOs) of these goals.
Organizational characteristics, such as that discussed below, were also recorded.
Importantly, the UIA's Yearbook also provides information on connections between IN-
GOs. Each organization is requested to provide information as to connections to other
INGOs. We use this information to compile an asymmetric or directed dichotomous square
matrix of the 4,378 * 4,378 organizations. This data forms the basis for the network analyzes
used in this project. A 1 in a datapoint represents a self-reported connection from a speciﬁc
INGO in that row to another INGO within the sample.
The use of network methods to describe the INGO network provided many interesting
insights into how INGOs collaborate and the impact this networking behavior may have on
eﬀectiveness, eﬃciency, and information transmission. Below, we ﬁrst describe the INGO
network.
2.2 INGO Networks
Figures 1-4 highlight the network of INGO collaboration that is identiﬁed from the dataset.
In all ﬁgures, isolates, or INGOs without any ties to the overall network, are removed, and
the ﬁgures are organized with those organizations central to the network at the center of the
graphic.5 The size of the INGO node in these ﬁgures represent the eigenvector centrality
score, which, as mentioned, is a function of its connection to other actors that are also central
to the overall network (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Hanneman and Riddle 2005). Figures 1-
4 are representations of the individual issue-speciﬁc INGO networks. These ﬁgures are quite
striking and show that there are dramatic diﬀerences between INGO networks. Although, at
ﬁrst glance, some of these diﬀerences are due to diﬀerent percentages of non-isolate INGOs
for each issue-area, there also appears to be very diﬀerent inter-issue networking patterns for
5Proximities in the graph are determined by geodesic distance using the spring embedding program within
Netdraw, with 500 iterations each(Borgatti, Everett and Freeman 2006). Geodesic distances determines the
optimal or most eﬃcient path length between nodes (Hanneman and Riddle 2005).
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the organizations. For example, node size is much larger for a handful of organizations in
the human rights INGO network, as shown in Figure 1. The environmental INGO network,
as illustrated in Figure 2, also has some variation in node size. Worth noting, however, it
takes on a very diﬀerent overall structure, as determined by geodesic distances. There are
two rings of connected organizations: an outside ride with many central INGOs and an
inside ring with much networking behavior. This visualization could indicate some division
within the environmental INGO network.
The sustainable development INGO network, as visualized in Figure 3, is striking for two
reasons. First, it is surprising how few of nodes within this network are not isolates. Of the
158 INGOs that solely had a sustainable development mission, only 56 are not completely
isolated from the network. In addition, those that are connected are typically connected to
only 1 or 2 other sustainable development INGOs. This would oﬀer some support to Cooley
and Ron (2002)'s claim that development INGOs are uncoordinated, perhaps because of
inter-INGO competition for aid funds. This could also indicate a lack of capacity among
these INGOs; sustainable development INGOs might be especially likely to lack the capacity
required to network or coordinate amongst themselves.
Figure 4, the health INGO network visualization, though containing more nodes than the
human rights INGO network, does also appear to have a similar structure. The organizations
with the largest eigenvector distance are at the center of the representation and many other
organizations are connected to the overall network.
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Figure 1: Human Rights INGO Network, 2001
Node Size by Eigenvector Centrality, Geodesic Distances, Isolates Removed
Sources: UIA (2001/2002)
Figure 2: Environment INGO Network, 2001
Node Size by Eigenvector Centrality, Geodesic Distances, Isolates Removed
Sources: UIA (2001/2002)
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Figure 3: Sustainable Development INGO Network, 2001
Node Size by Eigenvector Centrality, Geodesic Distances, Isolates Removed
Sources: UIA (2001/2002)
Figure 4: Health INGO Network, 2001
Node Size by Eigenvector Centrality, Geodesic Distances, Isolates Removed
Sources: UIA (2001/2002)
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2.3 Describing Network Structure
Though these basic visualizations can be useful at gaining insights into the INGO network,
descriptive characteristics of network structure can provide us with further information as to
the characteristics of the INGO network and how the composition of the network can impact
the ability of INGOs to work collaboratively.
Across disciplines, much attention has been paid to the existence of small world networks
(Milgram 1967; Watts and Strogatz 1998; Latora and Marchiori 2001; Watts 2004a; Siegel
2009). According to Watts and Strogatz (1998), a small world network is deﬁned as a type of
network structure that exhibits (a) high clustering, deﬁned as actors with a high probability
of connection through an intermediary actor, and (b) a short average path length or distance
between actors. Many times, these properties are summarized in a small world quotient
(Kogut and Walker 2001; Sinani et al. 2008; Cho and Fowler 2009).6 Though there is no
deﬁnitive test for the existence of a small world network, the larger the small world network
quotient, the greater the likelihood that small world characteristics are present within the
overall network structure (Kogut and Walker 2001; Sinani et al. 2008; Cho and Fowler 2009).
Small world networks, it is argued, are important for information transmission, innovation
and eﬃciency (Watts and Strogatz 1998; Cho and Fowler 2009). Networks with small world
structures would allow for information to be conveyed quickly but still be resilient if an actor
were to drop out of the network. Small world networks would allow even a lot of actors that
are specialized locally to still innovate (Watts 2004b; Newman, Barabasi and Watts 2006;
Watts and Strogatz 2006). Small world network properties, as Shirky (2008) points out,
would allow large numbers of small groups of social movement organizations to be connected
to each other.
However, as Uzzi and Spiro (2005) point out, small world structures may innovate cre-
6This quotient summarizes the ratio of the normalized clustering coeﬃcient and path length statistic.
Normalized clustering coeﬃcients are found by dividing the observed cluster coeﬃcient by that calculated
to be likely in a random network of the same size. Similarly, normalized path length statistics are calculated
by dividing the actual average path length of the network by the random path length ( Kogut and Walker
2001; Sinani et al. 2008).
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atively only to a certain threshold. In addition, as pointed out in Lazer and Friedman (2006)
discussion of the dark side of the small world, small world connectedness may limit overall
collective action problem-solving. Especially when there is a long time horizon, a longer
average path length may be preferred for problem solving (Lazer and Friedman 2006). This
type of critique of the small world connectedness may mean that these properties should
not be desirable for INGO networks, especially within issue-speciﬁc INGO networks working
with a long time horizon.
Given the existing theoretical literature on speciﬁcally advocacy INGOs, it seems plau-
sible that small world properties would be evident in networks of INGOs, especially those
with a human rights or environmental focus (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Ropp 1999;
DeMars 2005). According to the prominent Keck and Sikkink (1998), transnational advo-
cacy networks are comprised of local groups of INGOs and domestic actors richly connected
to each other. However, as Murdie, Brewington and Davis (2009) found with reference to
the network of human rights INGOs, the network structure was rather sparse, with very few
central players and many INGOs that were not connected to the overall network. This was
also found in other INGO networks (Caniglia 2001; Anheier and Katz 2004; Katz 2006; Wong
2008; Lake and Wong 2009). This would imply that issue-speciﬁc INGO networks might not
exhibit many small network properties. Describing the existence or absence of small world
properties in INGO networks may provide insights into information transmission between
INGOs.
Tables 1 provide the summary statistics for the individual issue-speciﬁc INGO network
structures. As the table highlights, the individual issue-speciﬁc INGO networks do not have
a high degree of small world properties. In fact, the INGO network displays far fewer small
network properties than even a divided U.S. Congress (Cho and Fowler 2009). In every case,
the clustering coeﬃcient within the networks is lower than expected at random. Additionally,
the average path length is much longer than expected at random. In a way, given the
conventional, slightly idealistic thinking of INGOs, this is rather surprising. However, as
11
many critiques of the dominant framework have contended, INGOs may have incentives not
to collaborate and there are divisions within the INGO community that might not facilitate
a short path length connecting small groups of organizations (Cooley and Ron 2002; Smith
2002; Author 2009). Alternatively, the low small world quotients might actually make INGO
networking more innovative as a whole (Uzzi and Spiro 2005; Lazer and Friedman 2006).
Most of the individual issue-speciﬁc INGO networks have similar small-world properties
and, as a result, similar small-world quotients. A notable exception, however, is the small
world quotient observed for the sustainable development INGO network; it is over 5 times
greater than for other issue-speciﬁc networks. One explanation could be that there is a low
average path length from INGOs that are connected to the network. However, as mentioned
above, about half of the INGOs within this network are completely isolated. As Kaiser (2008)
points out, the existence of such a high number isolates can complicate the conclusions drawn
concerning small-world properties. The theoretical work by Lazer and Friedman (2006) could
also provide insights into why sustainable development INGOs exhibit a much higher issue-
speciﬁc small-world quotient. If sustainable development INGOs are more likely to work in
a time urgency situation and have a shorter time horizon compared to other INGOs, Lazer
and Friedman (2006)'s work concludes that their collective action problem-solving beneﬁt
from a higher degree of small world properties.
Overall, the small-world properties, as shown in Table 1, highlight how relatively dis-
connected the various INGO network structures are. This could indicate diﬃculties with
communication and coordination which could harm overall INGO eﬀectiveness. Addition-
ally, these results highlight some diﬀerences in the structures of the various issue-speciﬁc
INGO networks. Given recent research concerning the role of time horizons and network
structure, further theoretical development concerning the time-horizon diﬀerences of issue-
speciﬁc INGOs is also deﬁnitely necessary (Lazer and Friedman 2006).
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3 Heterogeneity in the INGO Community
Having demonstrated that there are clear diﬀerences in the structure of INGO networks
across issue areas, we turn our attention to explaining the factors that drive these diﬀerences.
An obvious set of factors that can explain diﬀerences in networks is heterogeneity among
the actors in the network. We look at three primary sources of heterogeneity among INGOs
- mission focus, location of origin of the INGO, and links to IGOs. This section outlines
INGO diﬀerences across these three potential factors and discusses how these diﬀerences
could condition the propensity of INGOs to collaborate. After discussing unit heterogeneity,
we present a set of testable implications.
In addition to INGO diﬀerences in issue or mission area focus, mentioned above, the
extant literature points to important diﬀerence between INGOs based on their country or
region of origin (Elliot 1987; Eccleston 1996; Salm 1999; Mawdsley, Townsend and Porter
2005; Stroup 2008). Much has been written about diﬀerences between INGOs based or
with a permanent location in the global North, often thought of as developed democracies
in Western Europe and North America, and INGOs based in the global South, those
INGOs based in developing countries (Elliot 1987; Eccleston 1996; Smith 2002; Salm 1999;
Mawdsley, Townsend and Porter 2005; Stroup 2008). Organizations in the global North
have been cited as having larger operating budgets, international media connections, and
more formal internal bureaucracies (Elliot 1987; Salm 1999). These characteristics, in many
regards, have made Northern INGOs more powerful than their Southern counterparts. For
example, as Salm (1999) points out, Northern NGOs' power stems from their experiences,
their reputation and proven records of success, and their size and global reach (91-92).
Conversely, organizations in the global South have been cited for their often deep con-
nections to local populations and knowledge of local conditions (Elliot 1987; James 1994).
For service provision activities, they can be greater stake-holders to the local population's
development (James 1994). For advocacy activities, Southern INGOs, like solely domestic
NGOs, may have a more in-depth knowledge of repression perpetrators and victims and may
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have deep connections to local allies within the government (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Okafor
2006). However, as many have pointed out, Southern INGOs often lack funding, organiza-
tional capacity, and international media connections (Elliot 1987; Eccleston 1996; Salm 1999;
Mawdsley, Townsend and Porter 2005; Stroup 2008). Some contend that lack of capacity
for Southern INGOs have made them beholden to their Northern counterparts, which often
serve as funding intermediaries between IGO and governmental aid and the Southern INGOs
who work on the ground (Fowler 1992; James 1994; Fisher 1997).
Worth noting, however, as Elliot (1987) and Stroup (2008) point out, not all INGOs
within either the North or the South are identical in this regard. Though there are powerful
divisions in capacity and focus between Northern and Southern INGOs, these groups are in
no way homogeneous themselves. Stroup (2008), for example, ﬁnds powerful and compelling
diﬀerences between Northern advocacy INGOs capacity and operating structure that reﬂect
underlying policies from the Northern INGO's country of origin. Future research that looks
at distinctions within INGOs based in the global North and the global South is certainly
necessary.
Finally, another major distinction between INGOs concerns their working relationships
with IGOs and states (Carapico 2000; Dieng 2001; Willetts 2002; Kelly 2005; UNECOSOC
2009). Many IGOs, such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank, have consultative
status or working relationship status that INGOs can apply for (Willetts 2002; Kelly 2005).
These consultative status arrangements provide the INGO with some additional access to the
workings of the intergovernmental organization and can be required for aid funding (Chiang
1981; Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler 1998; Otto 1996; Willetts 2000; Alger 2002). To
gain consultative status, organizations must ﬁll out a lengthy application and participate
in a review process (UN 2008). To gain status with the UN Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) or the World Bank, for example, an INGO has to state how its motivations
and policy positions reﬂect the overall goals of the intergovernmental organization (Willetts
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2002; Kelly 2005; UN 2008).7 INGOs are asked about their governing structures, their
relationships to any governments, and to list all monies received in the last ﬁve years with
detailed explanations of how the funds were used. For ECOSOC consultative status, these
applications are then reviewed by both governmental and non-governmental representatives
and, if documentation is suﬃcient, the INGO is granted consultative status (UN 2008). This
process, which is very arduous and time-consuming, is often a source of status for the INGO
and can serve as a signal of the INGO's intent and interests (Author 2009). Once accredited,
many INGOs proudly list their UN Consultative Status on their organization's stationary
and website.
In short, there are many sources of heterogeneity between INGOs. Though in no way
comprehensive, issue-area focus, permanent location, and relationships with IGOs are all
factors that highlight the diﬀerences between INGOs. In the next section, we connect these
diﬀerences to variation in the capacity and desire of INGOs to collaborate with each other.
3.1 Heterogeneity and its Connection to Networking Behavior
Though INGO collaboration may improve their overall impact, not all INGOs may have
the same desire or capacity to join together. The heterogeneity highlighted above could
condition the formation of the INGO network (Caniglia 2001; Anheier and Katz 2004; Katz
2006; Murdie, Brewington and Davis 2009).
First, the INGO literature is clear that INGOs collaborate out of a need to join forces
in the pursuit of common goals (Keck and Sikkink 1998; DeMars 2005; Ahmed and Potter
2006). It follows, therefore, that INGOs with similar issue focuses would be more likely to
collaborate because of similar mission-based desire for collaboration. This also appears to
be consistent with practitioner reports on INGO networking (Abelson 2003; Clark, Sprenger
7As such, the vast majority of INGOs with consultative status are based in the global North, recent
reports from the UN show that 66% of organizations with ECOSOC consultative status are based in either
Europe or North America (UN 2008).There is a growing movement to increase the number of Southern
INGOs with ECOSOC consultative status (Wieczorek-Zeul 2005).
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and VeneKlasen 2006). INGOs with similar mission statements concerning environmental
policy advocacy, for example, would be more likely to come together to work on a shared
project or join forces in the crafting of policy statements than, for example, an INGO with
a focus on health and one on the environment. These INGOs are also more likely to meet
through shared conferences or gatherings. Additionally, it would seem likely that individuals
in similar INGOs would know each other. This is often referred to as the revolving door of
INGO employment and advocacy (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 9). Within the network literature,
this propensity to tie because of similar characteristics is often referred to as homophily
(Wasserman and Faust 1994; Hanneman and Riddle 2005).
Worth mentioning, we identiﬁed many INGOs that could be classiﬁed as hybrids, pro-
viding both advocacy and service provisions (Kelly 2005). Out of the 4,378 organizations
that ﬁt the accepted deﬁnition of an INGO, 843 had mission statements that included some
combination of human rights, sustainable development, environmental, or health goals. For
example, many health INGOs could possibly be classiﬁed as both advocacy and service orga-
nization. The growth of rights-based approaches, for example, has led to a growing number
of INGOs that could be classiﬁed as human rights and health, environment, or development
(Van Tuijl 2000; Nelson and Dorsey 2008).
What about the networking behavior for these hybrid INGOs? What networking behav-
ior would seem likely for them? Based on the same homophily characteristics as within-issue
area networking, it would appear consistent that these organizations would be more likely
to tie with each other. However, because of the multiple issue-area focuses, it would also
seem likely that these organizations would be more likely to tie to non-hybrids as well. For
example, an INGO with a rights-based approach to health may ﬁnd it advantageous for its
mission to collaborate with INGOs both within the health community and those within the
human rights community. It would also, of course, be likely to connect to other INGOs with
rights-based approaches.
These arguments would lead to the following testable implication:
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HYPOTHESIS 1: INGOs with similar issue-area foci will have a greater
propensity to tie to each other. Hybrid INGOs will have a greater
propensity to tie to each other and across issue-focuses.
Although issue-area focus could result in a diﬀerent propensity to collaborate based mainly
on desire, diﬀerences between INGOs based on the permanent location characteristics could
lead to diﬀerences in networking behavior based predominantly on capacity. As mentioned,
Southern INGOs often lack funds and international connections. Their organizational ca-
pacity diﬃculties could result in less of an ability to network with each other, as well as with
their Northern counterparts (Manji 1997; Mawdsley, Townsend and Porter 2005; Ahmed
and Potter 2006).8 This is consistent with ﬁndings made in Murdie, Brewington and Davis
2009 with respect to human rights speciﬁc INGOs. Further, desire for collaboration across
the North-South divide may be low. Although, as Elliot (1987) contends, Northern INGOs
may be able to improve the manpower and technology systems of INGOs based in the
South, many have pointed out problems with dependency issues and trust which could limit
the desire of North-South connections (Fowler 1992; James 1994; Manji 1997; Dieng 2001;
Manji and O'Coill 2002; Mawdsley, Townsend and Porter 2005). These arguments are some-
what counter to the dominant transnational advocacy network approach, which would imply
more of a symbiotic relationship between Northern INGOs and their Southern or domestic
counterparts (Keck and Sikkink 1998).
In short, there appears to be both capacity-related and desire-related reasons to expect
more North-North networking behavior and less North-South and South-South collaborations
then would appear at random. This could be stated as the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2: INGOs diﬀer in their propensity to interact or tie
8Worth mentioning, however, is the growing movement to facilitate South-South collaboration. One
example of this would be the annual Southern NGO Caucus for Sustainable Development.
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based on their permanent location. Organizations in the global North
are more likely to tie with each other. Southern INGOs are less likely
to tie with each other and less likely to tie with Northern INGOs.
Further, INGOs with connections to IGOs may have more of a chance to collaborate with
each other. Through shared meetings and conferences, their collaboration is encouraged and
they, perhaps, have more of an opportunity to connect with each other (Clark, Friedman and
Hochstetler 1998; Kelly 2005; Wieczorek-Zeul 2005) Additionally, these INGOs, because of
the increased status from their IGO consultative status, may be more desirable collaboration
partners for even INGOs without consultative status (Dieng 2001). Finally, because of the
capacity required to complete the regisration process required to get IGO consultative status,
it is more likely that these INGOs also have greater capacity to collaborate and communicate
with other INGOs generally. This line of reasoning implies:
HYPOTHESIS 3: INGOs with formal connections to IGOs will have a
greater propensity to interact/tie to each other and a greater propen-
sity to tie with INGOs without formal connections to IGOs.
Hypotheses 1-3 all relate heterogeneity in the INGO sector to diﬀerences in their propensity
for networking or collaborative behavior. Hypotheses 4 and 5 address how the INGO network
in general could be related to its overall ability to communicate and work eﬀectively and the
overall network structure.
Because INGOs with diﬀerent issue-area focuses have varying reasons for collaboration
and networking behavior, we contend that issue-area dynamics can create signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences not only in an INGO's propensity to tie but also in their location and role within the
overall INGO network structure. For example, advocacy INGOs, such as human rights or
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environmental INGOs, as mentioned, might be more hierarchical, due to the need for col-
laboration for information transmission purposes (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Wong 2008; Lake
and Wong 2009). In line with Cooley and Ron (2002), we might expect service INGOs to
take a very informal network structure, with lots of disconnectedness. The literature seems
to generally imply that issue-area INGOs should be unique in their overall network structure
characteristics. This broad statement translates into the following general hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 4: Network characteristics vary for INGOs with diﬀer-
ent issue-area focuses.
One ﬁnal issue-area dynamic desires attention: what about hybrids? How should their
position within the overall network vary? Because hybrids eﬀectively stand in multiple
issue-area camps, it follows that these organizations would likely serve as bridges between
subsets of INGOs. This contention, though straightforward, is not readily discussed within
the extant INGO literature, which has tended to either see all INGOs as homogeneous or
leave out INGOs with hybrid goals. It can be restated as the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 5: INGOs that have mission statements that are hy-
brids of diﬀerent issue areas serve as bridges between INGO groups.
If supported, Hypothesis 5 shows the powerful role hybrid INGOs have within the overall
INGO network and would suggest that further focus on these hybrids is deﬁnitely necessary.
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4 Data Analysis
4.1 Network Methodology
We use a variety of network methods to evaluate the 5 hypotheses outlined above. First, for
Hypotheses 1-3, which all refer to how the characteristics of an INGO impacts its propensity
to collaborate or tie, we use tests for two-group diﬀerences in tie density, as outlined in
Hanneman and Riddle (2005). Much like a Pearson Chi-Square Test, this test examines
whether the number of ties within and between two groups are diﬀerent than would be
expected at random. Because relational ties are not independent, statistical tests utilized
here rely on bootstrapping and use random iterations (Cliﬀ and Ord 1973; Borgatti, Everett
and Freeman 2006). As a robustness check, we also use variable homophily blockmodels to
test these hypotheses as well.
Data measuring the characteristics of INGOs was coded from the 2001 Yearbook (see
description in section 2 above). We ﬁrst recorded whether each organization was in the
global North, which we deﬁned as having a permanent oﬃce location in an Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) country, or in the global South, deﬁned
as having no permanent oﬃce locations in an OECD country. As an alternative, we also
recorded whether each organization reported having members in an OECD country or not.
We also recorded the connections each organization reported to UN ECOSOC and the various
World Bank components. These measures were all dichotomous, indicating the presence or
absence of the connection.
For Hypothesis 4 and 5, we rely on measures of eigenvector centrality, closeness, betwee-
ness (hierarchical reduction level), coreness, and cutpoints using conventions in the literature
(Wasserman and Faust 1994; Hanneman and Riddle 2005). We then calculate the mean of
these measures for each issue-area focus grouping of INGOs. To test Hypothesis 4-5, we use
a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) method to test for diﬀerences between the means
of these network measures between these groups. Standard errors are also calculated using
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a random iteration process (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). Below, we brieﬂy outline each of
these measures of network characteristics.
First, eigenvector centrality captures actors that have connections to other actors central
to the network (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). Closeness captures the position of an actor
relative to all others in the network (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). Hierarchical reduction is
based on betweeness centrality, looking at actors in the middle of the network that serve
as a bridge in information transmission (Wasserman and Faust 1994:188). 9 This measure is
useful at examining which INGOs are essential for information ﬂow and INGOs that connect
subgroups of the network.
The two remaining measures are useful in focusing on how the INGO network facilitates
information transmission and coordination between INGOs and how this information trans-
mission varies across issue-areas. These measures also help in understanding which actors
can be bridges within the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Hanneman and Riddle
2005). First, continuous coreness captures the degree to which a certain actor is in the core
instead of the periphery of the overall network. A higher coreness score would indicate that
the actor is more likely in the core of the network (Borgatti and Everett 2000). If there is a
large variance within coreness scores within a network, this would indicate a more stratiﬁed
network. The ﬁnal measure that is useful for understanding the importance of individual
actors within the network is cutpoints. By cutpoints, we are referring to actors that act
as brokers among otherwise disconnected groups (Hanneman and Riddle 2005:187). These
actors can be thought of as bridges between otherwise disconnected groups of actors within
a network. If these cutpoints were missing, information transmission through the network
would be vulnerable to collapse.
9 Through this approach, actors within a network are divided into diﬀerent levels based on their betweeness
centrality scores; a higher level indicates that the actor is more central to the hierarchy.
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4.2 Analyzes and Results
Consistent with Hypotheses 1-3, we ﬁnd that organizational characteristics of INGOs do im-
pact their propensity to tie. This is consistent with the network literature on homophily; we
ﬁnd, in general, that organizations with similar characteristics are more likely to collaborate
or tie to each other (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Hanneman and Riddle 2005). Below, we
ﬁrst lay out these ﬁndings, summarized in Table 3, before addressing Hypotheses 4-5.
Hypothesis 1 is supported for the issue-areas of human rights and sustainable development
as well as for INGOs with hybrid issue-focuses, as shown in Table 2. As such, human
rights INGOs, for example, have a greater propensity to tie to each other than exhibited at
random (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). Reinforcing what was seen in Figure 4, there could
be divisions within the environmental INGO network that is preventing the same homophily
eﬀect. Additionally, health INGOs do not tie to each other any diﬀerent than expected at
random. Further unpacking of the exact mission statements of INGOs within these issue
areas could be interesting for examining why homophily eﬀects are not observed for these
INGOs.
As expected, our results indicate that hybrid INGOs are also more likely to tie to each
other and to tie to INGOs across issue-areas. This is seen in the non-hybrid-hybrid grouping
in Table 2. This result highlights the organizational need for hybrid INGOs to both work with
other hybrid INGOs and to work with a wide variety of INGOs with multiple issue-focuses.
Permanent location also matters for an INGO's propensity to tie. Consistent with the
expectations outlined in Hypothesis 2, INGOs based in the global North are more likely
to tie to each other and less likely to tie to Southern INGOs. Southern INGOs tie to
each other no diﬀerently than expected at random. As a robustness check, we also coded
North-South divisions based on the existence of a member or volunteer in an OECD country
(North) or not (South). These results are consistent; however, as shown in Table 2, INGOs
without a member in an OECD country are less likely to collaborate with other INGOs with
membership based solely in the global South. These ﬁndings highlight diﬀerences in capacity
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of INGOs that could limit collaboration within the INGO network.
We also ﬁnd support for Hypothesis 3: INGOs with formal connections to either the
World Bank or ECOSOC have a greater propensity to tie with each other than expected at
random. Also, as expected, these organizations have a greater propensity to tie to INGOs
without formal connections to IGOs. This could indicate both a high capacity for networking
amongst these INGOs and a higher desire for other INGOs to form collaboratives ties with
them.
In short, these homophily results highlight the heterogeneity within the INGO network
and the need for future empirical and theoretical research on divisions between INGOs and
their impact on INGO networking behavior.
Additionally, as outlined in Hypothesis 4, we ﬁnd variation in the network characteristics
of INGOs with diﬀerent issue-area focuses; the group means of network characteristics are
not the same for INGOs with diﬀerent issue-area focuses. These results are highlighted in
Table 3.10 As shown in the ﬁrst column, the mean eigenvector centrality, which can be
thought of as a measure of how importance your friends are in the network, varies for the
diﬀerent INGO groupings. The highest eigenvector centrality scores are found for both the
human rights and the hybrid INGO groups. For hybrid INGOs, their multiple issue-area
focuses may make them seek out key players across networks, raising this score. For human
rights INGOs, their need to get information to INGOs with connections to the international
media may increase their desire to tie to INGOs that are seen as important by others within
the network.
Mean closeness scores, as outlined in the second column of Table 3, also vary within the
issue-speciﬁc groupings. However, these measures, though distinct between INGO groupings,
are all within the same general range. Hybrid INGOs are more closely linked, on average,
to the overall INGO network than the other INGO issue-speciﬁc groups.
Hybrid INGOs are also more likely, as a group, to be the actors in the middle or bridge
10Results are also consistent if a t-test is used to examine the diﬀerence between hybrid and non-hybrid
INGO groups.
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of the overall INGO network. These results are consistent.with Hypothesis 5. This is shown
in column 3 of Table 3, which displays the high group hierarchical reduction by betweeness
measure for hybrid INGOs, and in column 4, which shows the high mean cutpoint scores
for hybrid INGOs. Additionally, in both of these tests, the diﬀerences in means between the
various groups is statistically signiﬁcant. Hybrid INGOs, because of their multiple interests,
serve to connect multiple subgroups of INGOs. Without hybrid INGO, the overall INGO
network is at risk for separation (Hanneman and Riddle 2005).
5 Implications and Conclusions
INGO networking has been central to much of the theoretical literature related to the role
of non-state actors in political and social change (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp and
Sikkink 1999; DeMars 2005). Many contend that the strength of INGOs is in their ability to
coordinate quickly in order to get attention or services for a particular issue or region (Fisher
1998; DeMars 2005; Ahmed and Potter 2006). However, recent scholarship has also shown
incentives within the INGO community for competition instead of coordination (Petras 1999;
Cooley and Ron 2002). Also, interests and capabilities may limit the ability of INGOs to
work cooperatively on a speciﬁc issue (Smith 2002, 2005; Mawdsley, Townsend and Porter
2005). In short, though networking is supposed to occur, evidence of uncoordination also
exists.
Despite the prominent theoretical role networks have played in the extant literature on
INGOs, little attention has been payed to the actual network itself. This paper advances the
existing literature by actually examining the structure of the INGO network. Though this
examination is largely descriptive, this description provides many insights into the eﬃciency,
hierarchy, information transmission, and overall ability of the INGO network to collectively
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work for political and social change (Krackhardt 1994; Siegel 2009; Watts 2004a; Lazer and
Friedman 2006).
In addition, this paper advances the INGO literature by highlighting key diﬀerences
within the INGO community and outlining the role these diﬀerences can have in networking
behavior. Importantly, organizational characteristics impact both network structure and the
propensity to tie. There are structural diﬀerences between the human rights, sustainable
development, health, and environmental networks. Additionally, issue-area focuses, per-
manent locations, and IGO connections aﬀect an organization's propensity to tie. Future
research should focus on how heterogeneity within the INGO community impacts coordi-
nation. Scholarship that divides out subcategories of issue-speciﬁc INGOs and looks at
their network structure would be extremely valuable. Likewise, projects could highlight how
network structure evolved over time within issue-area.
Finally, we draw attention to the existence of hybrid INGOs with multiple issue-area
focuses. Though largely missing from the extant literature, these hybrids take a very im-
portant bridge role within the network. Their role in information transmission and their
growth within the INGO sector deﬁnitely deserves a second look.
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